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 New closeness and betweenness based centrality measures have been 
evaluated in this paper. Power grid is modeled as a directed graph. The graph 
is analyzed in terms of complex network theory to identify influential nodes 
which control power flow pattern throughout the whole grid and as a result 
can create cascade if removed unintentionally or targetedly. Various 
measures of impacts have been analyzed to show that power grid has scale-
free network characteristics, i.e., it is very much vulnerable to targeted node 
removal. Measures of impacts include characteristic path length, connectivity 
loss and blackout size. Rank similarity analysis have been carried out to 
show that nominal condition of power system gives critical nodes which 
remain critical with changes in system operating conditions as well. 
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The Cascading failures in a power system can be triggered anywhere in the system initiating various 
damages of several components within the grid, which can propagate to any place in the system. It is initiated 
as a sequence of dependent failures of various components that successively deteriorates the ability of the 
power grid to continue its intended functionality [3]. Technology is progressing day by day and there have 
been huge investments in system reliability and security. But blackout is still occurring all over the world. 
The latest reported large-scale blackout is found to be California blackout in the early September of 2011 
[15]. 
Several researchers have come forward for the risk assessment of cascading outages. Various 
attempts have been taken by researchers in improving the understanding of cascading outages can be broadly 
categorized as monte-carlo simulation methods and analytical techniques [38]. Examples of these methods 
and techniques include several probabilistic, deterministic method as well as approximate and heuristic 
techniques. Pros and cons of these methods along with their limitations are addressed in [33]. 
ASSESS [34], CAT (Cascade Analysis Tool) [27], POM-PCM (Physical and Operational Margins - 
Potential Cascading Models) [4] are deterministic tools used by industries to analyze and simulate cascading 
events. There is a huge number of rare, unforeseeable phenomena that could trigger cascading which could 
lead to blackout. Some events are so complicated that cannot be analyzed deterministically. So, several 
researchers have taken the probabilistic approach of determining vulnerability. 
Some methods are starting to emerge based on statistical analysis of cascading failure. Hidden relay 
failures are modeled probabilistically and some countermeasures are proposed to prevent cascading effect 
[10]. Short-circuit analysis together with reactive reserve calculations are used to identify vulnerable regions 
in a power grid [9]. Since cascading is very complicated and complete enumeration of all possibilities is 
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impossible, there are necessarily compromises and limitations in assessing cascading risk. Since it is not 
feasible to include all possibilities in a model, there are significant limitations in the methods based on 
probabilistic approach of cascading outages. 
In recent years, there have been significant involvement of researchers in analysing the power grid 
from the perspective of complex network theory. Power grid topology is shown to possess the characteristic 
of small-world network in the seminal paper [40]. The power grid is also shown to inherit the ability to cope 
with random attacks but it is very vulnerable to targeted attacks since the abstract network model of the grid 
shows scale-free distribution [35]. 
These preliminary results intrigued the interest of the scientific community to analyse the power grid 
from a holistic point of view. Debate is going on whether the purely topological approach of analysis is 
sufficient or does it provide useful information about the vulnerability of the power grid [22]. Several 
researchers have considered both topological and electrical characteristics of the network when using 
complex network based analysis to model the cascading effect in power system [6, 12]. 
It is well established that the power grid functionality can be significantly reduced by removing a 
small number of components. So, it is necessary to identify those critical components that can cause severe 
cascading effect in power system which could lead to blackout and cost billions of dollars. Identification of 
critical components is one of several directions of research in power system based on complex network 
theory. This set of nodes or lines have been named critical components, attack vectors, vulnerable 
components etc. in various literature. To show the effectiveness of the proposed methods, several measures 
of impact are adopted. These measures show the degradation of network functionality as cascading 
progresses. 
Critical transmission line analysis is carried out to find which lines when removed from the system 
can have negative maximum impact on the grid [14]. Complex network theory based shortest path algorithm 
[32] is used find influential lines in terms of triggering cascading events in power grid. It is argued that power 
does not necessarily flow over the shortest path and utilizing maximal possible flow that a network can 
sustain under different conditions the model of cascading failure is revised and new model based on maximal 
flow approach [23] is proposed in [13]. This approach takes huge time to execute and the method is used to 
find out critical lines in standard IEEE test systems [12]. A more realistic approach based of Power Transfer 
Distribution Factor (PTDF) is used to simulate cascading event in an attempt to identify correlated lines [25]. 
Network efficiency loss and amount of load shedding due to removal of critical components are 
used by some researchers as a measure of impact. Bus admittance matrix is used to model the power system 
as a graph [7] and DC load flow is used to find flows in different lines which comes with its inherent 
limitation of finding real power only. A hybrid approach combining DC load flow with hidden failures in 
relays is considered for improving the previous method [8]. 
Based on network centrality measures of power grid, critical components are found from three 
different point of views [31] and their usefulness are discussed. Similar to the concept of bus admittance 
matrix [36] and bus impedance matrix [20], motivated by the gatekeeper concept of social network [16], bus 
dependency matrix is formulated and the characteristics of the matrix is explored in [30]. A step by step 
method to formulate the matrix from the system data is presented in [29]. Relationship of bus dependency 
matrix with closeness and betweenness centrality measures are also formulated. 
This paper discusses the effect of removal of nodes found from bus dependency matrix [30]. 
Proposed method gives a rank of nodes based on betweenness and closeness centrality depending on 
centrality scores. Effect of changing nature of load and generation of power systems which varies throughout 
the day has been investigated on the rank of the critical components. This issue of rank similarity is of 
interest among computer scientists [17, 24] but has not yet been addressed in case of power system. A more 
detailed analysis discussion on this issue is presented in  [28]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Power system model required for analysis based on 
complex network approach is described in Section 2. How to obtain the closeness and betweenness based 
centrality scores and ranks from the power system data is briefly highlighted in Section 3. Effect of loss of 
nodes with higher centrality scores is shown in Section 4. Whether the proposed rank of criticality is 
invariant or not with system load and generation is explored in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper 
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Figure 1. Simple 5 bus system 
 
 
The In order to demonstrate the application of centrality measures of complex network framework 
in power grid, representation of the power grid as a graph is the first step [7]. From the perspective of 
network theory, a graph is an abstract representation of a set of objects, called nodes or vertices, where some 
pairs of the objects are connected via links or edges. 
Any power system network can be represented by a graph ),,(= WEVG  comprising of a set V , 
whose elements are called vertices or nodes, a set E  of ordered pairs of vertices, called edges or lines . An 
element ),(= yxe  of the edge set E , is considered to be directed from x  to y . y  is called the head and 
x  is called the tail of the edge. A set W , whose elements are weights of edge set elements. There exists a 
one-to-one correspondence between set E  and set W . 
To illustrate various concepts of complex network in power system, a simple example of 5  bus 
system [36] is used in this paper. Fig. 1 depicts the system with 5  bus bars, and 7  links connecting them. 
We can model the system as a graph which contains 5  nodes/vertices which correspond to the slack, 
voltage-controlled, and load bus bars of the original system. The transmission lines can be represented by the 
7  links/edges which connects various nodes. The system data is given in Table 1. 
For the network in Figure 1, }{1,2,3,4,5=V , 




Table 1. System Data for Network in Figure 1 





Bus Bus in pu in pu in pu 
1 2 0.20 0.6110 0.030 
1 3 0.08 0.1123 0.025 
2 3 0.60 0.5139 0.020 
2 4 0.06 0.5663 0.020 
2 5 0.04 0.1155 0.015 
3 4 0.10 0.5727 0.010 
4 5 0.08 0.2725 0.025 
 
 
3. ELECTRICAL CLOSENESS AND BETWEENNESS BASED CENTRALITY MEASURES 
A centrality measure for electric power grid which considers electrical topology rather than physical 
topology is recommended in [21]. Topological and electrical centralities are proposed to rank various 
substations of the power system network [37]. A method is proposed to carry out contingency analysis in 
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power grids based on graph edge betweenness [19]. Based on admittance and impedance matrix various 
centrality measures to rank relative importance of nodes and edges in an electrical network are proposed in 
[39]. 
Electrical closeness and betweenness based modified centrality measure are proposed in [30, 31]. 
Here, the outline to find out centrality indices are presented. 
Let, stP  be the maximum power flowing in the shortest electrical path between buses s  and t , and 
)(kPst  is the maximum of inflow and outflow at bus k  within the shortest electrical path between buses s  





kPkr )(=)(  (1) 
 
 where, the ratio )(krst  is an index of the degree to which buses s  and t  needs bus k  to transmit 
power between them along the shortest electrical path. 
The pair dependency of nodes in a network is defined in [16]. The concept of pair dependency as 
proposed in [16] is used here in case of electrical power grid. The dependency of bus pairs can be regarded as 
the degree to which a bus s  must depend upon another bus k  to transmit its power along the shortest 
electrical path or geodesic to and from all other reachable buses t 's in the network. For a power grid with n  
number of buses the dependency of bus s  upon bus k  to transmit power on any other buses in the network 


















The dependency of bus pairs for the whole system can be calculated and the result can be 

























=D  (3) 
 
Each element of D  is an index of degree to which a bus designated by row number must depend 
upon another bus designated by column number to transmit its power along the shortest electrical path or 
geodesic to and from all other reachable buses in the network. Thus, this matrix captures the information of 
importance of a bus as an intermediary with respect to other buses in the network. So we can call the matrix 
D  as bus dependency matrix. 
The procedural steps to find bus dependency matrix from the system data is as follows:   
1.  Modeling the system as a graph.  
2.  Finding a shortest path set for the graph using Johnson's algorithm.  
3.  Obtaining flow in various lines of the system solving load flow problem.  
4.  Calculating the maximum power flowing in the shortest electrical path between buses s  and t , 
stP , for the shortest path set.  
5.  Identifying )(kPst , the maximum of inflow and outflow at bus k  within the shortest electrical 
path between buses s  and t .  
6.  Evaluating bus dependency matrix D  from stP  and )(kPst .  
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The sum of the elements of the k -th column of bus dependency matrix is the electrical betweenness 
of the k -th bus of the system. The sum of the elements of the k -th row of bus dependency matrix is the 
electrical closeness of the k -th bus of the system. 
 
 
4. MEASURE OF IMPACT  
Having found the critical nodes, it is necessary to analyze the consequence of removing nodes from 
the system and justify whether or not the nodes are really critical in terms of their ability to trigger cascading 
effects. There are a variety of measures by which one can analyze this consequence. In this paper, three 
measures are considered. The first two of them, characteristic path length and connectivity loss are purely 
topological. The third one, blackout size is found from a simple model of cascading failure. The measures are 
discussed below: 
 
4.1. Characteristic Path Length 
The characteristic path length is used by researchers as a measure of network connectedness. It is 
the average length of the shortest paths between any two nodes in the network [2]. It is found that if a node is 
removed from a system, it generally increases the distance between other nodes. So, the increase in network 
characteristic path length is considered as a measure of impact analysis of removing critical nodes from the 
system. 
Distance between two vertices can be computed as: 
 
||=),( Pminvud  (4) 
 










 where  ),(0 vud . k  is the number of connected pairs. 
 
4.2. Connectivity Loss 
 This is a purely topological measure of impact a power grid encounters when some nodes are 
removed from the system. In this measure we calculate how much connectivity is lost in terms of how many 
generators a transmission or distribution node can access due to effect of removing a node from the system. 
The lesser the number of generators a node is connected with the less is the redundancy and the more is the 








C ><1=   (6) 
 
 where the averaging is done over each intermediate nodes, i.e., substations. gN  is the total number 
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Figure 2. Impact of removing critical nodes from standard IEEE 300 bus test system in terms of increase in 
characteristic path length, connectivity loss and blackout size 
 
 
Since it is not possible to exactly model the blackout, various approximate measures have been 
taken by several researchers to mimic the situation [5, 11, 22, 26]. 
Power system is a very much complex interconnected system whose exact modeling would require 
consideration of dynamics of rotating machines and devices within the system, discrete dynamics of 
switchgear elements, non-linear algebraic equations that govern line flows and social dynamics of governing 
and operating bodies. 
In this paper, a fairly simple model of cascading failure of the power grid is proposed by 
incorporating important electrical features ignoring those which are too complicated but have little effects. 
The detail of the model is described here. 
At first AC power flow is used to calculate the steady state condition of the network. Real and 















i sinYVVQ    (8) 
 
where the symbols have their usual meanings as found in power system literature. 
During the analysis, generator and load dynamics are not included. Although the limitation of not 
using dynamics of generators and loads are well understood but it is at least useful for modeling one 
mechanism of cascading failure that is cascading overload. Also, Generation Shift Factors (GSF) and Line 
Outage Distribution Factors (LODF) [42] are used to recalculate flows in lines after disturbance, i.e., after a 
new generator comes in or goes out; a new transmission line is switched on or tripped out. This helps 
achieving fast results without using actual load flow after each disturbance. The speed and accuracy of the 
result and comparison with actual load flow is out of the scope of this paper and will be addressed in another 
research article in future. 
Also, time delayed over current relays are used in every line so if there is a lot of overload it trips 
fast and if there is a little bit of overload it trips slowly. Another thing that is added to the model is ramping 
up of generators. As the system separates into sub grids, generators are allowed to ramp up or ramp down to 
rebalance a little bit. 
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So, if a component failure disturbs the supply-demand balance, through generator set-point 
adjustment this balance is achieved. But if there is not enough ramping ability, then the ultimate choice is to 
trip lowest possible system load. The total amount of load shedded is used as the blackout size. 
Two standard test systems are used to demonstrate the result of removing critical nodes from the 
system found from the proposed method . The test systems are standard IEEE test system [41] and Australian 
test system [18]. Effect on the IEEE test system of the removal of critical nodes found from proposed 
electrical closeness and betweenness based measures as well as classical closeness and betweenness based 
measures [39] are given in Fig. 2. 
It is clear from the two figures that, the impact of removing critical nodes found from the proposed 
method is higher than removing nodes obtained from topological centrality measures. So, we can certainly 
conclude that topology alone cannot provide sufficient information about power grid vulnerability rather it 
could produce misleading information. In terms of increased characteristic path length, closeness centrality 
measures have greater impact than betweenness based measures. But, betweenness based measure hampers 
the system most when connectivity loss and blackout size indices are considered. 
 
 
5. RANK SIMILARITY 
In a typical power system, load varies from time to time and generation have to match the load and 
line loss. For this reason, various power flow profiles are found in the system during various seasons of the 
year. Even the scenario is different at different times in a day. To demonstrate that the proposed power flow 
based centrality method gives critical nodes which is insensitive to system load and generation change, an 
Australian test system is considered which provides six test cases from heavy to light load conditions [18]. 
 
  
Table II. Six Normal Steady-State Operating Conditions of Australian Power Grid 
    Case 1   Case 2   Case 3   Case 4   Case 5   Case 6  
  Load Condition   Heavy   Medium Heavy   Peak   Light   Medium   Lightest  
Generation (MW)   23030   21590   25430   15050   19060  14840 
 Load (MW)   22300   21000   24800   14810   18600   14630  
 
 
Table 1 gives the six normal steady-state operating conditions for the system. Betweenness and 





Figure 3. Variation of rank of nodes based on closeness centrality measures 
 
 
Variation of ranks of the Australian test system in six test cases are shown in Fig. 3 for closeness 
centrality measures and for betweenness centrality measures in Fig. 4. From the figures it is clear that 
betweenness based measure is more rank stable than the closeness one. In case of betweenness based 
measure first three rank positions do not change in six different operating conditions, whereas in case of 
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closeness centrality there are small variations in ranks two to four positions. In case of rank five there is a 
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